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I. INTRODUCTION

The globalization of the internet and technology has caused “child
pornography being traded over the Internet [to] rise exponentially.” 1 It has
allowed images to be transferred from the computer of one individual to
that of millions through just the click of a button. Robert S. Mueller, of
the Federal Bureau of Investigations, imputes the rise in child exploitation
* Rebekah A. Branham, J.D. candidate at The University of Akron School of Law, May 2020. I
express my gratitude to the editors and associate editors of the Akron Law Review for their valuable
feedback and assistance. A special thanks also to my family and fiancé for their unwavering
encouragement and support.
1. Daniel S. Armagh, Virtual Child Pornography: Criminal Conduct or Protected Speech?,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993, 1994 (2002).
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to the readily available Internet, stating that “An increasing amount of this
exploitation takes place in the dark shadows of the Internet . . . .” 2 In
attempts to reverse this incredulous crime, private computer programs are
taking steps to identify shared child exploitation on the internet—in some
instances, in the absence of adequate warrants. 3 Their efforts involve a
method known as hash-based evaluation (“hashing”). Hashing allows
private computer programs “to identify suspect material from enormous
masses of online data, through the use of specialized software programs—
and to do so rapidly and automatically without the need for human
searches.” 4 Richard Salgado, former senior counsel in the Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the United States Department
of Justice, explains: “The concept behind hashing is quite elegant: take a
large amount of data, such as a file or all the bits on a hard drive, and use
a complex mathematical algorithm to generate a relatively compact
numerical identifier (the hash value) unique to that data.” 5 Today, hashbased examination is used throughout the forensics process to “[combat]
the online distribution of unlawful aberrant content.” 6 Hashing assists
private computer programs in “assess[ing] whether a suspect’s computer
contains files . . . known to be contraband” 7 and is authorized under 18
U.S.C. § 2258(C) to screen images to detect child sexual abuse.8 Internet
service providers (“ISP”) do this by comparing the unique algorithm
generated from the hash to databases containing hash values associated
with known child pornography, such as the images stored by the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). 9 These distinctive
identifiers, recently dubbed the “digital fingerprint,” 10 are the seeds of
2. Robert S. Mueller III, Child Exploitation on the Internet: The Dark Side of the Web, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 6, 2006), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speeches/childexploitation-on-the-internet-the-dark-side-of-the-web [https://perma.cc/AV3A-GNVY].
3. Dennis Martin, Demystifying Hash Searches, 70 STAN. L. REV. 691, 700 (2018) (“And
[law enforcement officers] might sometimes use hash values to identify evidence of crimes outside
the scope of their warrant.”).
4. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 636 (5th Cir. 2018).
5. Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and Richard P. Salgado, Fourth
Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 38 (2005) Power of the Hash,
119 HARV. L. REV. F. 38 (2005).
6. Reddick, 900 F.3d at 637.
7. Marcia Hofmann, Arguing for Suppression of ‘Hash’ Evidence, CHAMPION, May 2009, at
20.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2258(C).
9. Hofmann, supra note 7, at 20. (“A hash may also help to assess whether a suspect’s
computer contains files already known to be contraband. For instance, the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children maintains a database of hash values of child pornography files, which can be
compared to files on other computers to see if there are any matches.”).
10. Martin, supra note 3, at 695.
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controversy within the realm of the Fourth Amendment. Advocates of
hash-based examination argue that, because the tool only reveals the
presence or absence of illicit material while “exposing little, if any,
ancillary information,” the Fourth Amendment is not violated. 11
Adversaries, however, argue that hashing has unconstitutionally extended
police investigative powers, allowing them to discover criminal material
“outside the scope of a search warrant.” 12 So long as there remains no
clear, definitive standard for searches of data on computer hard drives,
hashing will continue to be of controversy among lower courts.
One particular computer software program developed in 2010,
Microsoft PhotoDNA (“PhotoDNA”), has the ability to scan and identify
large numbers of explicit photos in a matter of seconds using the hashing
method. 13 When new images are uploaded onto the internet, social media
sites, or email service providers, the program can automatically run that
photo against its own database of digital markers “without the need for
human searchers.” 14 Computer software programs that perform hashbased evaluations operate at a high degree of accuracy.15 Common hashvalue algorithms have the ability to “generate numerical identifiers so
distinctive that the chance that any two data sets will have the same [hash
value], no matter how similar they appear, is less than one in one
billion.” 16 If a hash value match is found, “PhotoDNA creates a
‘CyberTip,’ sending the file and the uploader’s IP address to NCMEC.” 17
NCMEC is a “private, non-profit . . . corporation whose mission is
to help find missing children, reduce child sexual exploitation, and

11. Salgado, supra note 5, at 41; see also Martin, supra note 3, at 693.
12. Martin, supra note 3, at 693 (“For many years, government investigators have used digital
forensic software to conduct hash searches: a very accurate, very computationally efficient type of
search that can be used not just for legitimate purposes but also to identify evidence of crimes outside
the scope of a search warrant.”).
13. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 635, 637–38 (5th Cir. 2018).
14. Id. See also United States v. Coyne, 387 F. Supp. 3d 387, 392 (D. Vt. 2018) (“A large and
sophisticated [ISP] such as Microsoft employs its own human reviewers before forwarding the tip [to
NCMEC]. Small [ISPs] such as Chatstep may choose to forward tips automatically without reviewing
any images themselves.”).
15. Martin, supra note 3, at 716 (“And even though accuracy is relevant not to whether a given
technique is a search but only to whether it’s sufficient to establish probable cause, it’s also true that
hash searches are highly accurate. The odds of two files producing the same hash value are
‘infinitesimally small’. . . .”).
16. Ronald J. Hedges et al., Managing Discovery of Electronic Information, Third Edition,
Federal Judicial Center, at 52 (2017), available at https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/
Managing_Discovery_of_Electronic_Information_3d_ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FYL-QRFL].
17. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 638 (5th Cir. 2018).
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prevent child victimization.” 18 It works in conjunction with ISPs and law
enforcement in discovering child sexual abuse and trafficking on the
internet. NCMEC operates a “national 24-hour toll-free hotline by which
individuals may report information regarding the location of any missing
child” known as the Cyber Tipline (“Tipline”). 19 The Tipline has seen
much prosperity. Since 1998 when the Tipline was developed, more than
25 million instances of child pornography images have been reported. 20
In 2008, Congress imposed obligations requiring ISP’s to report “actual
knowledge of any facts or circumstances” of a violation of any child
pornography statute to the NCMEC. 21 While providers are required to
report hash value matches, they are not, however, required to engage in
affirmative monitoring or investigating alleged perpetrators.22
Few courts have addressed whether the use of hash values by ISPs
violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Courts that have
addressed the issue focus their attention on whether NCMEC is a
governmental entity. 23 However, the Fifth Circuit has very recently
addressed this issue in United States v. Reddick. 24 After the defendant
uploaded files to the cloud-sharing server SkyDrive, 25 PhotoDNA, a
software program that uses hash-based examination, automatically
reviewed the hash values of those files and compared them against its
database of known child pornography hash values. 26 It proceeded to report
the files to law enforcement. 27
This note will examine the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in the Reddick
decision. While it ultimately agrees with the outcome, it attempts to
reconcile the oversimplified analysis the Fifth Circuit used in arriving at
its decision. It is increasingly important that future defendants are
afforded a thoughtful, balanced, and definitive legal analysis. This note
18. About
Us,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
MISSING
&
EXPLOITED
CHILDREN,
http://www.missingkids.com/footer/about [https://perma.cc/KP35-S5V6].
19. 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b)(1)(M)(i) (2018).
20. United States v. Coyne, 387 F. Supp. 3d 387, 392 (D. Vt. 2018).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A) (2018).
22. See 18 U.S.C. §2258A(f) (2018) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a
provider to (1) monitor any user, subscriber, or customer of that provider . . . (3) affirmatively search,
screen, or scan for facts or circumstances . . . .”); see also Alexandra L. Mitter, Alexandra L. Mitter,
Deputizing Internet Service Providers: How the Government Avoids Fourth Amendment Protections,
67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 235, 245 (2011).
23. See, e.g., Coyne, 387 F. Supp. 3d at 397; United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d. 1292, 1300–
04 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 644 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v.
Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364–68 (4th Cir. 2010).
24. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018).
25. Presently referred to as “OneDrive.”
26. Reddick, 900 F.3d at 637–38.
27. Id.
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proceeds in three parts. Part I catalogs the constitutional and statutory
requirements for searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Part
II analyzes the reasoning for the outcome in Reddick. Part III concludes
with a proposed analysis for all cases involving the use of the hash value,
child exploitation, and Fourth Amendment violations.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Constitutional Requirements for Search and Seizure

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes
that: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 28 It safeguards
individual liberties by prohibiting two unreasonable intrusions by the
government: searches and seizures. 29 “A search occurs when the
government infringes upon an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable.” 30 “Seizure of a person occurs when the
government meaningfully interferes with his liberty; seizure of property
occurs when the government meaningfully interferes with an individual’s
possessory interests in property.” 31 Both of these protections extend to
“computer[s] or its peripheral equipment.” 32 Customarily, the Fourth
Amendment is only implicated by searches carried out by the
government. 33 However, Section IV of this note discusses a caveat to that
general rule—the private search doctrine.
While considerable dialogue about specific warrant requirements
exceeds the scope of this note, it is important to highlight the three
categories of searches of electronically stored information as recognized
in three separate Supreme Court cases: 34 (1) searches that require warrants
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 174–75 (5th Cir. 1987).
30. Id. at 175.
31. Id.
32. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity of Search or Seizure of Computer, Computer
Disk, or Computer Peripheral Equipment, 84 A.L.R. 5th 1, 2a (2000). In addition to the exceptions
to the warrant requirement discussed in this note, computers and other personal electronic or digital
storage devices are also subject to additional, unrelated exceptions, including but not limited to the
“border search doctrine.” See, e.g., Claudia G. Catalano, Border Search or Seizure of Traveler’s
Laptop Computer, or Other Personal Electronic or Digital Storage Device, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. Mitter, supra note 22, at 246.
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supported by probable cause; 35 (2) searches conducted without a warrant
but with “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity “may be afoot”; 36
and (3) searches conducted without a warrant or particularized
suspicion. 37 Unfortunately, as a result of the ever changing technological
advancements, digital media does not securely fit into the framework of
the Fourth Amendment. 38 While the Supreme Court readily continues to
develop new tests in an attempt to withstand our contemporary use of
technology, 39 it has yet to develop a standardized analysis for the use of
hash-based examination in criminal investigations.
B.

The Use of The Hash Value and The Fourth Amendment

Hash value algorithms are “powerful and pervasive” tools used by
law enforcement for digital forensics purposes. 40 The properties of hash
values have been equated to a human’s DNA, meaning that it is virtually
impossible for two images or videos to possess the same hash value.41
Salgado notes four different properties of hashing that make it such a
valuable and reliable tool. First, every file has only one hash value, and
editing just one pixel of that file will generate a new hash value.42 A hash
value is generated in a way that “[t]he chance of two different inputs
‘colliding,’ . . . is astronomically small.” 43 Thus, they produce highly
definitive results that can be relied upon by law enforcement officers.
Second, hashing offers law enforcement officers a method to examine
only important digital files, weeding out any ancillary information and
preserving the privacy interests of the subject. 44 Third, once the hash value
has been generated, it “cannot be ‘reversed’ to generate the photo itself.”45

35. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
37. See generally Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
38. Mitter, supra note 22, at 246 (“The Supreme Court has often struggled to fit rapidly
changing technologies into this framework.”).
39. Id. (“The Supreme Court has often struggled to fit rapidly changing technologies into [the
Fourth Amendment] framework. The Court often tries to develop unique tests that will allow the
Fourth Amendment to keep pace with technological change.”).
40. Salgado, supra note 5, at 38.
41. Id. at 42 (“There is essentially no chance that any other hard drive would have the same
hash value.”).
42. Id. at 39 (“First, the hash value will be, for all practical purposes, uniquely associated with
the input. No other file will have the same hash value as the . . . photo, except a file that is identical.”).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 46 (“It . . . provides a means to discard from the examination the irrelevant, and focus
on the important, while exposing little, if any, ancillary information.”).
45. Id. at 40 (“A second property is that the hash algorithm works only in one direction. One
can calculate a hash value from input, but cannot derive the input from the hash value.”).
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Lastly, hashing does not require a file to be physically opened and
therefore is seemingly non-intrusive. 46 However, confusion about whether
to categorize hashing as a Fourth Amendment violation stems from this
very non-intrusive nature of it. Because the file is never physically
opened, adversaries dwell on the de minimis risk of a false hash value
match.
C.

Statutory Protection of Internet Activity

In the interest of Americans’ significant value of their individual
privacy, Congress protects their reasonable expectation of privacy and
regulates internet activity through the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA). 47 Without clear application of the Fourth
Amendment to electronically stored information (“ESI”), Congress set out
to “balance the government’s need to obtain evidence with the public’s
desire to maintain privacy of electronic communication and electronically
stored information.” 48 The goal of the ECPA is to “‘fill the gaps’ left by
the uncertain application of the Fourth Amendment protections to Internet
communications.” 49 The ECPA includes three federal statutes: the Stored
Communications Act; 50 the Pen Register statute; 51 and the Wiretap Act. 52
Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in 1986 to
“protect individuals’ private communications held in electronic
storage . . . .” 53 The SCA provides circumstances in which the
government can compel ISPs to disclose records. 54 Section 2702 of the
SCA also provides circumstances in which an ISP can voluntarily disclose
records. 55 An ISP is generally prohibited from voluntarily disclosing
customer communications and subscriber records to a governmental
entity, subject to just a few limited exceptions. 56 Section 2702(b)(6)
46. Salgado, supra note 5, at 42.
47. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat.1848.
48. Laura J. Tyson, A Break in the Internet Privacy Chain: How Law Enforcement Connects
Content to Non-Content to Discover an Internet User’s Identity, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1257, 1268
(2010).
49. Id.
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2018).
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2018).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2018).
53. Denae Kassotis, The Fourth Amendment and Technological Exceptionalism After
Carpenter: A Case Study on Hash-Value Matching, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1243, 1259 (2019).
54. 18 U.S.C § 2703(a) (2018).
55. 18 U.S.C § 2702 .
56. Id.
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allows an ISP to “divulge the contents of a communication to the
[NCMEC]” in order to report child sexual exploitation. 57
Importantly, an individual alleging a violation of the SCA has a
narrow list of remedies, and suppression of the evidence is not one of
them. 58 Remedies based solely on a violation of the SCA include
“preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be
appropriate,” “damages,” and “reasonable attorney’s fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred.” 59 Only when an individual can prove
a violation of the Fourth Amendment in conjunction with a violation of
the SCA is suppression of the evidence a remedy. 60
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The recent developments in hash-based examination have not gone
uncontested. Advocates for hash-based examination firmly believe it is
the sheathing against the war on child pornography. 61 Defendants,
however, have attempted to challenge evidence seized through hash-based
contraband detection on two grounds. 62 First, on the grounds that the “law
enforcement officers [have conducted an] impermissible Fourth
Amendment search[],” and second, that the “hash value match . . . [was]
an inadequate basis for probable cause.” 63 Both arguments have proved to
fail. 64 This note focuses on a recent case in which this challenge was
made: United States v. Reddick. 65 Reddick concerned one of the most
controversial and contentious issues in today’s society driven by
technology—governmental intrusion into personal computer content. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision directly addressed this conflict
and has the potential to change the direction of the Fourth Amendment

57. Id. at § 2702(b)(6).
58. Kassotis, supra note 53, at 1260.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(b)(1–3) (LexisNexis 2018).
60. United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014) (“For [a defendant] to suppress
the . . . data, he therefore must show that the cell site location data was obtained not just in violation
of the [SCA], but also in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
61. Thorn Staff, Eliminating Child Sexual Abuse Material: The Role and Impact of Hash
Values, THORN, https://www.thorn.org/blog/eliminating-child-sexual-abuse-material-hash-values/
[https://perma.cc/8Z6N-V7CS] (John Shehan, Vice President of NCMEC, states: “In the 16 years that
I’ve devoted my career towards child protection at NCMEC, I can confidently say that hash values
are the way forward. Together, we have made a huge difference in the lives of children around the
world, and I am proud to have been a part of making these tools a reality.”).
62. Martin, supra note 3, at 703.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018).
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jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit decided Reddick on August 17, 2018. 66
The defendant, Henry Reddick, uploaded digital files onto a cloud hosting
service known as Microsoft SkyDrive. 67 SkyDrive then used a proprietary
technology called PhotoDNA to “scan the hash values of the uploaded
files and compare them to the hash values of known images of child
pornography.” 68 PhotoDNA detected a hash value match between
Reddick’s photos and the database, and SkyDrive created a “CyberTip,”
sending the files and users’ IP address to the NCMEC. 69 NCMEC then
forwarded the same information to the Corpus Christi Police Department
in Corpus Christi, Texas. 70 Corpus Christi Police Department Detective,
Michael Ilse, opened the files to confirm they contained child
pornography. 71 Thereafter, Ilse received a warrant, searched Reddick’s
home, seized his computer, and found “additional evidence of child
pornography in [his] possession.” 72 Reddick was indicted for possession
of child pornography. He asserted that “Officer Ilse’s review of the
files . . . was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment,”
and therefore, all the evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed
pursuant to the exclusionary rule. 73 In denying his motion, the district
court relied on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, finding
that the law enforcement officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively
reasonable. 74
The U.S. Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule to bar
prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of an “illegal
search.” 75 The Supreme Court recognized the good faith reliance on
search warrants that are later found to be invalid in United States v. Leon
when it stated: “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial

66. Id.
67. Id. at 637.
68. Id. at 639.
69. Id. at 638.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 638 (5th Cir. 2018).
72. Id.
73. United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56577, at *8 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 13, 2017).
74. Id. at *15. (“Officer Ilse fully recited the circumstances by which he came into possession
of the Phase I files and the fact that he opened them and viewed them. This exhibits a firmly held
conviction that his Phase I investigation, including viewing of the files, was appropriate and lawful.”).
75. Id. at *13 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)).
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costs of exclusion.” 76 In Reddick, the district court, relying on Leon, chose
to honor the detective’s good faith reliance on the search warrant used to
enter and search Reddick’s residence and his computer.77
The district court decision recognized five relevant factors for
demonstration of a reasonable expectation of privacy. These five factors
include:
(1) whether the defendant has a property or possessory interest in the
thing being searched; (2) whether the defendant has a right to exclude
others from the place; (3) whether he has exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy; (4) whether he took normal precautions to
maintain privacy; and (5) whether he was legitimately on the premises. 78

The privacy issue, according to the district court, does not end
there. 79 The answer to the overarching issue of whether hash-based
evaluations constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes requires
an exhaustive analysis in the context of each independent case. The
district court recommended a series of additional “technology-specific
determinations involving undeveloped facts and law” beginning with a
review of the scope of the private search, the significance of the hash value
“view,” and any expectation of privacy that remains and including:
Whether a subsequent search by law enforcement provide any additional
information that was not already known? 80 Will viewing the file expose
additional images that do not contain contraband? 81 Is law enforcement’s
view of the files after NCMEC a new search? 82 Is a hash value match
reliable enough to equate it to an image of contraband? 83
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial on a much
broader basis, giving limited attention to scope of the law enforcement
officer’s “search.” It relied on the private search doctrine to guide its
reasoning and found that the viewing by Detective Ilse did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 84 In general, regardless of whether invasions of
privacy by a private individual “[are] accidental or deliberate and whether
76. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (1984) (“[S]uppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant
should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion
will further the purpose of the exclusionary rule.”).
77. Reddick, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56577, at *16.
78. Id. at *9–10. See also United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 457 (2001) (quoting United
States v. Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 1998)).
79. Reddick, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56577, at *11.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 2018).
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they [are] reasonable or unreasonable, they [do] not violate the Fourth
Amendment, because of their private character.” 85 Subsequent and
additional invasions of privacy by the government, beyond those
committed by a private party, “must be tested by the degree to which they
exceeded the scope of the private search.” 86 Notably stated by the Fifth
Circuit:
The exact issues presented by this case may be novel. But the governing
constitutional principles set forth by the Supreme Court are not. The
government effectively learned nothing from Detective Ilse’s viewing
of the files that it had not already learned from the private search.
Accordingly, under the private search doctrine, the government did not
violate Reddick’s Fourth Amendment rights. 87

When PhotoDNA detected a hash value match, created a CyberTip, and
sent the file to NCMEC, the Fifth Circuit interpreted it as a private search
by Microsoft that frustrated whatever expectation of privacy the defendant
had. 88
The Fifth Circuit’s oversimplified analysis leaves significant tension
between balancing an individual’s right to privacy and the utility of hashbased examination. To prevent future misapplication of the law, it is time
for a thoughtful, balanced, and definitive legal analysis. Given the
sensitivity of the Fourth Amendment, as well as the need to develop new
procedures to abolish child exploitation, courts should afford each factor
thorough analysis to avoid eroding constitutional protections of the
accused.
A.

Private Search Doctrine

Although the Supreme Court stated that “searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by [a] judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,” 89 one of those
exceptions is the private search doctrine. The private search doctrine
presents a caveat to the Fourth Amendment that allows the government to
“receive and utilize[] information uncovered by a search conducted by a
private party.” 90 The contemporary developments in technology,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984).
Id.
Reddick, 900 F.3d at 640.
Id. at 639.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 2018).
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including the developments in hash-based examination have, however,
given purported surrogates of the government room to circumvent Fourth
Amendment protections. The Fourth Amendment is only implicated when
private parties conduct searches “with both the knowledge of law
enforcement authorities and with the intent to assist those authorities.”91
Thus, it would follow that when law enforcement agencies utilize
information volunteered by third parties who lack the intent to assist law
enforcement agencies at the time they conducted the initial search, it is
beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 92
In Reddick, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that, “the critical inquiry under
the Fourth Amendment is whether the authorities obtained information
with respect to which the defendant’s expectation of privacy has not
already been frustrated.” 93 The court turned its attention to whether the
defendant’s “expectation of privacy in his computer files had already been
thwarted” by PhotoDNA prior to the subsequent examination by
Detective Isle. 94 The court’s analysis was guided by a United States
Supreme Court case decided in 1984 regarding contraband in a shipping
package. 95 In United States v. Jacobsen, Federal Express (“FedEx”)
employees opened a damaged package and found a suspicious white
powder beneath “layers of wrappings” and concealed in a tube. 96 FedEx
put the contents of the tube back in the package and reported their
discovery to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 97 The DEA
reopened the package and conducted both a visual examination as well as
a chemical field test, and determined that the white powder inside the tube
was in fact cocaine. 98 Additional agents arrived, conducted another search,
and then obtained a warrant to search the return address listed on the
package. 99 The Court held that the DEA did not infringe on any privacy
interest of the defendant that had not already been frustrated by the

91. Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 75, 79 (1994).
92. In United States v. Walther, the Ninth Circuit articulated a “critical factor test” to
distinguish between private and government action. The court looked at the government’s role in the
search, the government’s control of the searcher, and most relevant here, the private party’s intent in
conducting the search. The latter of the three entails an analysis of whether the private party had some
legitimate independent motivation for the search, separate and apart from aiding the police in a
successful prosecution of the suspect. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
93. Reddick, 900 F.3d at 638 (quoting United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 461 (2001)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 639 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
96. Jacobson, 466 U.S. at 111.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 112.
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FedEx. 100 Warrantless searches of effects are “presumptively
unreasonable” when conducted by a governmental entity, not when
conducted by a private party. 101 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that
the subsequent search conducted by the DEA infringed no legitimate
expectation of privacy, simply because that expectation had already been
frustrated by a private party. 102
Once the Court established that FedEx had not infringed on the
defendant’s constitutionally protected “reasonable expectation of
privacy,” it held that the proper test is one that tests “the degree to which
[the latter governmental search] exceeds the scope of the private
search.” 103 The Jacobsen Court relied on a standard adopted by a majority
of the Court set forth by two Justices in Walter v. United States. 104 Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart, stated: “[S]urely the Government may
not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make
an independent search.” 105 The Court proceeded to describe how, in
Walter, the private actor was only able to draw inferences about the
contents of the package and, therefore, the latter governmental search was
a “significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously
by a private party. . . .” 106 However, the distinction in Jacobsen came
down to the availability of the contraband. The DEA did not have to draw
inferences about the contents of the package, as it was in plain view when
it was turned over to the government and was freely made available for
their inspection. Removing the tube from the package after the FedEx
employee had already done so did not reveal anything that had not been
previously learned during the private search. 107
Similarly, in Reddick, when law enforcement officers viewed the
files, they were doing so to simply to “dispel[] any residual doubt about

100. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 126 (1984).
101. Id. at 130 (noting that the Fourth Amendment is “wholly inapplicable” to searches
conducted by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government).
102. Id. at 126.
103. Id. at 115.
104. Id. (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (“Even though some
circumstances—for example, if the results of the private search are in plain view when materials are
turned over to the Government—may justify the Government’s reexamination of the materials, surely
the Government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an
independent search. In these cases, the private party had not actually viewed the films. Prior to the
Government’s screening one could only draw inferences about what was on the films. The projection
of the films was a significant expansion of the previous search that had been conducted previously by
a private party . . . .”).
105. Walter, 447 U.S. at 657.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984).
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the contents of the files.” 108 After the automatic review by PhotoDNA of
the package of digital files, law enforcement officers learned nothing from
their examination that had not already been examined. 109 Moreover,
Detective Ilse did not conduct a search of any files other than those
previously, and reliably, flagged as child pornography. 110
IV. A PROPOSAL
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence governing child pornography on
the internet has not been subject to rigorous judicial analysis. The
“tremendous growth” of the internet offers advantages to child
pornography sharing outlets: “(1) the rapid transfer of files/images; (2)
relatively high security; and of course (3) almost complete anonymity, all
of which significantly lower the risk of arrest to the child
pornographer.” 111 Meanwhile, the limited remedies for violations of the
Stored Communications Act “provide[] little incentive for a defendant to
make a Fourth Amendment challenge.” 112 Unfortunately, the lack of lucid
foundation for Fourth Amendment challenges against search and seizures
of electronically stored child pornography resulted in the Fifth Circuit
failing to establish thoughtful precedent for future courts presented with
the same issue. Combining the variation of analysis proffered by the
circuit courts, this note proposes that, on a case-by-case basis and paying
close attention to the circumstances surrounding the search, courts should
answer the following questions: (1) Was the individual that conducted the
initial search in fact acting as a private individual? (2) Was the defendant’s
reasonable expectation of privacy thwarted by the third-party doctrine?
(3) Was there probable cause for the warrantless search? (4) Was the
subsequent state actor acting within the scope of the private party search?
If the answer to any of the preceding questions is no, the defendant should
be entitled to challenge the admission of the evidence gained during the
unconstitutional search. The contemporary technological advancements
create ideal circumstances for the Supreme Court to craft a new test for
lower courts to consider.

108. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 2018).
109. Id.
110. Id. (“Significantly, there is no allegation that Detective Ilse conducted a search of any of
Mr. Reddick’s files other than those flagged as child pornography.”).
111. William R. Graham, Jr., Uncovering and Eliminating Child Pornography Rings on the
Internet: Issues Regarding and Avenues Facilitating Enforcement’s Access to ‘Wonderland’, 2000 L.
REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 457, 465 (2000).
112. Mitter, supra note 22, at 236.
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Private Party or Governmental Agency?

As discussed in the preceding section, Fourth Amendment
protections only apply to searches conducted by governmental entities or
agents. 113 Thus, an unreasonable search or seizure conducted by a private
party is exempt from those same constraints. 114 When presented with the
novel question of whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment safeguards
were violated as a result of modern “hashing” technology, the first step in
the proposed four-part analysis is to determine whether the entity acted as
a private party or an indispensable “surrogate of the government.” 115
While this certainty requires consideration of ISP’s statutory requirements
under 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a), the analysis does not stop there. This note
proposes a “totality of the circumstances” based approach when
determining whether the actual function and motivating purpose of the
ISP transformed it into an agent of the government. The Supreme Court
has reasoned that whether a private party is constrained by the Fourth
Amendment as an agent of the government “necessarily turns on the
degree of the government’s participation in the private party’s activities,
a question that can be resolved only ‘in light of all the
circumstances . . . .’” 116 An ISP is statutorily required to report discovered
files involving child pornography, 117 but that does not necessarily mean it
was required to affirmatively monitor its users or affirmatively search for
violations. 118 The operation of the hash-based examination rests in the
private hands of the ISP. But does an ISP lose its private nature simply
because it is engaged in work of social importance?
The circuit courts have considered the fine line between private
entity and governmental agent, but there is no universal test employed.
Rather, courts are divided between employing a two-part test and a similar
three-part test. The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits devised a two-part

113. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
114. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (explaining that protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment do not apply to searches conducted by private parties).
115. Michael J. Woods, Data Retention Requirements and Outsourced Analysis: Should Private
Entities Become Government Surrogates in the Collection of Intelligence?, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 49,
55 (2015) (proposing that when a private party is serving the government’s purpose, and not for
business purposes, it becomes a functional surrogate of the government).
116. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a) (LexisNexis 2018) (providing that where company has “actual
knowledge” of child pornographic pictures they must report this to the NCMEC).
118. § 2258A(f) (stating that “nothing in this section shall be construed” to require an ISP to
monitor any user or affirmatively seek facts).
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test. 119 The foundation behind this two-part test stems from a wellarticulated proposition established in United States v. Souza, stating that
“A search by a private person becomes a government search if the
government coerces, dominates, or directs the actions of the private
person conducting the search.” 120 The court in Souza determined whether
the characteristics of a private party transformed it into a governmental
agent by asking two questions: “(1) whether the government knew of and
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing
the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own
ends.” 121
The First Circuit has identified an additional important factor when
determining whether a private party’s actions transform it into a
governmental agent. The First Circuit analyzed: (1) “the extent of the
government’s role in instigating or participating in the search,” (2) “its
intent and the degree of control it exercises over the search and the private
party,” and (3) “the extent to which the private party aims primarily to
help the government or to serve its own interests.” 122
Regardless of the test employed, Fourth Amendment protections
must not be circumvented by permitting a governmental agent to operate
under the disguise of a private party. When applying these tests to the
technological realm, courts must look at the totality of the circumstances
in each particular case to determine first whether the “search” by the ISP,
not the subsequent “search” by NCMEC, triggers Fourth Amendment
protections. This begins with a consideration of the reporting
requirements of providers under 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a). Moreover, many
courts agree that a reporting requirement alone does not transform an ISP
into a governmental agent when it scans users’ files by choice. 123 Namely,
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Stevenson held that an ISP was not

119. See generally United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Miller,
688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000).
120. Saouza, 223 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 796 (10th Cir. 1989)).
121. Id.; see also United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1301 (10th Cir. 2016).
122. United States v. Silva, 554 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Pervaz,
118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997)).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 637–38 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that
while 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b)(1) required the ISP to report child pornography, it was not obligated to
search for the files, and therefore, was not controlled by the government); United States v. Richardson,
607 F.3d 357, 364–67 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that the statutory provisions requiring AOL to report
known child pornography did not convert AOL into a governmental agent for Fourth Amendment
purposes); United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that a duty to report
does not transform an ISP into a government agent when it is not affirmatively obligated to search an
individual’s computer but does so by choice).
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transformed into a governmental agent because the ISP had no affirmative
duty to discover files containing child pornography. 124
The analysis does not end there, however. It should also require
courts to explore any internal policies and procedures of the specific
internet service as well as the terms of service governing the client
relationship to determine whether the private party was acting as an
“agent[] or instrument[] of the government.” 125 The defendant in
Stevenson argued that even if the ISP was “not transformed into a
government agent by operation of law,” 126 a look at the particular
circumstances could prove that the ISP was acting as an instrument of the
government—affirmatively conducting hash-based evaluations in
attempts to assist the government in discovering files containing child
pornography, or developing its scanning program for its own business
reasons. 127
The developments in hashing technology have raised unforeseen
difficulties in the application of the private search doctrine. In Reddick,
the Fifth Circuit correctly noted that “the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated where the government does not conduct the search itself, but
only receives and utilizes information uncovered by a search conducted
by a private party.” 128 Unfortunately, that was the extent of the analysis
afforded to the defendant. The court stated:
The private search doctrine decides this case. A private company
determined that the hash values of files uploaded by Mr. Reddick
corresponded to the hash values of known child pornography images.
The company then passed this information on to law enforcement. This
qualifies as a “private search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. And the
government’s subsequent law enforcement actions in reviewing the
images did not affect an intrusion on [the defendant’s] privacy . . . . 129

Not only are there splintered decisions among federal circuit courts
regarding which test to use, but there is also a circuit split regarding the
scope of the search. The split makes the time ripe for the Supreme Court
124. Stevenson, 727 F.3d at 830. AOL used its automatic hash-based evaluation too to identify
files on Defendant’s computer containing child pornography. The hash value match automatically
alerted the National Center of Missing and Exploited Children, who then reported the tip to the Iowa
Department of Criminal Investigation. The law enforcement officers obtained a warrant and searched
Defendant’s home where they found 721 images of child pornography. Stevenson moved to suppress
the images arguing that his rights were violated under the Fourth Amendment.
125. Id. at 829 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
126. Id. at 830.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 2018).
129. Id.
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to articulate a more clear, operable and consistent framework for
analyzing the private search doctrine as applied to ISPs.
B.

Expectation of Privacy

In order to constitute a search or seizure under the confines of the
Fourth Amendment, the search or seizure must reasonably “intrude[] upon
a reasonable expectation of privacy in . . . a significant way.” 130 In Katz v.
United States, the Supreme Court changed the understanding of the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis into a more nuanced
understanding of the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not
subject to the Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. 131

In Justice Harlan’s concurrence, he articulated a two-prong test to
determine when a search is unreasonable: “[F]irst that a person exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” 132 Only activities that “intrude[] upon a reasonable
expectation of privacy in . . . a significant way” constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. 133 The rationale
behind the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard is that, once
confidential information is revealed by a private party, the expectation of
privacy is thwarted. The second inquiry of this four-part proposal requires
courts to consider whether the defendant had a subjective expectation that
the thing seized would “remain free from governmental intrusion.” 134
130. United States v. Paige, 136 F. 3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v.
York, 895 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1990)).
131. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the government’s attachment
of an electronic listening device in the telephone booth where defendant made a call violated the
defendant’s justified reliance on his right to privacy and thus, the government’s actions constituted a
“search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
132. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. Paige, 136 F.3d at 1017 (quoting York, 895 F.2d at 1028).
134. United States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Haydel,
649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981)) (“In assessing whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists,
we examine several factors including ‘whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing
seized or the place searched, whether he has the right to exclude others from that place, whether he
has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy that it would remain free from governmental
intrusion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain privacy and whether he was legitimately
on the premises.”).
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The principles of the third-party doctrine are straightforward: the
government may obtain information from third parties without first
procuring a search warrant. The long-standing third-party doctrine,
recognized in United States v. Miller in 1976, has endured for more than
40 years. 135 It “applies specifically when an individual voluntarily
conveys the information to a third-party that the government later
obtains.” 136 Under the third-party doctrine, individuals who entrust
confidential information in a third party relinquish any Fourth
Amendment protection of that information—even if it is later revealed to
government authorities. 137 This is true even when an individual reveals
information to a third party “on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in a third party will not
be betrayed.” 138 For example, generally, when an individual saves files to
a personal hard drive, they have demonstrated a “reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of those files.” 139 However, “[a] computer
owner or user may lose her expectation of privacy in the contents of the
computer’s memory if she makes the computer generally accessible to
others.” 140 When the same individual places the files on a cloud server,
such as Microsoft SkyDrive, he creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of
intrusion, and it cannot be said that he has manifested that same
expectation of privacy. 141
The third-party doctrine is regularly raised as a defense to the notion
that a defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in ESI. In
United States v. Miller, the Supreme court held that a bank customer had
“no protectible Fourth Amendment interest” in the copies of checks and
other bank records retained by the bank. 142 It articulated a clear rule stating
that the information revealed to a third party is not afforded Fourth
Amendment protection even when revealed on the assumption that “it will
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third

135. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
136. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1027 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
137. Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third
Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 437 (2013) (“[We] have held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by
[the third party] to the Government authorities. . . .”).
138. Id.
139. United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 937 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
140. Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L.
&& TECH. 75, 84 (1994).
141. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 937.
142. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
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party will not be betrayed.” 143 The justifications for the third-party
doctrine stem from the reasonable expectation of privacy test established
by the Supreme Court in 1967 in Katz. In Katz, the defendant made
telephone calls from a public telephone booth to make gambling
wagers. 144 FBI agents attached an electronic recording device to the
outside of the booth. 145 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of California convicted Katz for transmitting wagering
information by telephone. 146 The government introduced evidence of the
recorded telephone conversations, and the defendant objected. 147 The
Court discarded the previous notion that there are “constitutionally
protected areas” and constitutionally unprotected areas, stating that “[T]he
court has never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic
solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.” 148 It emphasized that “the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”; therefore, “what a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.” 149
As Katz suggests, if a court were to categorically define what digital
media is protected under the reasonable expectation of privacy theory, it
would essentially undermine the logical reasoning behind the Supreme
Court’s third-party doctrine. There is no magical line drawn to determine
what forms of electronic communication are and are not protected. Based
on a subjective standard, it would be reasonable to assume that an
individual has an expectation of privacy in an email sent to a family
member via his private email. Conversely, when a person uploads illicit
files to a cloud sharing server operated by Microsoft, does he really have
an expectation that those contents will remain free from inspection by the
government? Or does he assume the risk that the information could be
reported to authorities? To enlist a categorical rule providing all criminal
defendants with a reasonable expectation of privacy in images they upload
to cloud sharing software would be a misguided application of Fourth
Amendment principles. Therefore, the second inquiry under this proposed
analysis requires courts to step into the defendant’s mind to determine his
actual expectations at the time he or she engaged in the illegal act.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971)).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351 n.9.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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Are Hash Value Matches an Adequate Basis for Probable Cause?

Courts use hash-based examination as a trustworthy procedure to
establish that the results are an “authentic product of the evidence
seized.” 150 Some courts even compare the hash value to digital
fingerprints. 151 How reliable do these digital fingerprints have to be? The
Fourth Amendment requires a showing of probable cause before a search
warrant may be issued. 152 The Supreme Court defined probable cause as
“a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.” 153 When presented with issues involving hash-based
searches, the third prong of the test requires courts to determine whether
the hash value match serves as an adequate basis for probable cause.
Although there is always a small risk of mistake that could lead to a
violation of constitutional rights, all courts that have addressed the use of
hash searches as they pertain to illicit material generally “[find] them legal
and reliable.” 154 However, the district court in Reddick noted that “without
viewing the electronic image or the material from which the matching
hash value was sourced, one cannot say with certainty that the electronic
file is, in fact, contraband.” 155
An alteration of even a single pixel of a digital file will result in a
different alphanumeric value. 156 Thus, once a hash value match occurs,
the “suspected copy can be determined to be identical to the original file”
that is stored in a database. 157 Reddick argued that, because law
enforcement officers conducted the subsequent search pursuant to a
warrant based on information accessed through a warrantless search, the
evidence must be suppressed. 158 The Fifth Circuit failed to determine

150. Wayne Jekot, Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the Particularity Requirement,
7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2, 9 (2007).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Farlow, 681 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Thomas,
788 F.3d 345, 348 n.5 (2nd Cir. 2015); United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 242
n.3 (3rd Cir. 2017) (“a ‘hash’ is ‘[a] mathematical algorithm that calculates a unique value for a given
set of data, similar to a digital fingerprint, representing the binary content of the data to assist in
subsequently ensuring the data has not been modified.”); United States v. Wellman, 663 F.3d 224,
226 n.2 (4th Cir. 2011).
152. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
153. Id.
154. Martin, supra note 3, at 702.
155. United States v. Reddick, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56577, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2017).
156. United States v. Keith, 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36–37 (D. Mass. 2013) (“Any identical copy
of the file will have exactly the same hash value as the original, but any alteration of the file, including
even a change of one or two pixels, would result in a different hash value.”).
157. Id.
158. Reddick, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56577, at *8.
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whether the hash value match established “probable cause” as to yield a
“fair probability that contraband will be found in a particular place.” 159
In United States v. Cartier, a peer-to-peer file-sharing network used
hash-based evaluation to conduct searches of shared files.160 After
receiving several tips of images depicting child pornography previously
seized by law enforcement, the Spanish Guardia Civil Computer Crime
Unit (“SGCCCU”) notified the FBI’s Innocent Images Unit. 161 The FBI
obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s home based on the hash
match. 162 The defendant filed a motion to suppress and asserted that the
search warrant lacked probable cause because the detective relied upon
hash values that had not been viewed prior to the issuance of the
warrant. 163 The Eighth Circuit stated that “[p]robable cause exists when a
‘practical, common-sense’ inquiry that considers the totality of
circumstances set forth in the information before the issuing judge yields
a ‘fair probability that contraband and evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.’” 164 The defendant argued that, because there was no
human review of the files, there was, in fact, a possibility that two
different files on a computer will “collide or overlap,” generating the same
hash value. 165 However, the court stated that the proper test is not whether
it is certain that contraband will be found, but whether it is fairly
probable. 166 The lack of physical examination by an individual does not
undermine the reliability of hash-based examination and “does not
necessitate a finding that probable cause was lacking.” 167
Considering the totality of the circumstances, courts must verify the
reliability of the computer software program’s hashing technology.
Although some courts choose to analogize hashing to a drug-sniffing dog,
this analogy actually undervalues the reliability of hashing. 168 In fact, it

159. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 273 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
160. United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2008).
161. Id. at 445.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 446 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
165. Id. at 446 (“Although Cartier correctly asserts that no one reported seeing images of child
pornography on his computer prior to the execution of the search warrant, the lack of such evidence
does not necessitate a finding that probable cause was lacking.”).
166. United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 2008).
167. Id.
168. Robyn Burrows, Judicial Confusion and the Digital Drug Dog Sniff: Pragmatic Solutions
Permitting Warrantless Hashing of Known Illegal Files, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 279 (2011)
(“Hashing is actually much more accurate than a dog sniff since it is almost mathematically
impossible to mistake one file for another.”).
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has been regarded as 99.9999% reliable by law enforcement officers. 169
But that does not conclude the third prong of this analysis. It is not enough
for courts to breeze over this step by simply stating that hash-based
examination is reliable. It is extremely critical that they actually verify the
reliability and accuracy of the computer software program itself—
considering the resources, reliability, and records of each individual
computer software program before determining whether the hash value
match provides sufficient probable cause. The Fifth Circuit set a
dangerous precedent by not engaging in the same inquiry as the Eighth
Circuit.
D.

Expansion of the Private Search

The last prong of the analysis requires courts to examine whether the
additional intrusion by the governmental entity exceeded the scope of the
private search. Dating back to 1921, the Supreme Court recognized that
the scope of the Fourth Amendment extends only to protect against
searches by the government:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects only against searches and seizures
which are made under governmental authority, real or assumed, or under
color of such authority. If papers have been seized, even though
wrongfully, by one not acting under color of authority, and they
afterwards come to the possession of the Government, they may be
properly used in evidence. 170

In 1980, the Supreme Court reiterated that there is “‘nothing
wrongful’ about the government’s examination of the contents of the
packages that had been opened by private parties,” 171 so long as they do
not “exceed the scope of the private search.” 172 Absent an independent
right to conduct the search, 173 the government must stay strictly within the
realm of the third party search. So long as this standard is adhered to, and
169. United States v. Bershchansky, 958 F. Supp. 2d 354, 357 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). See also
Martin, supra note 3, at 705.
170. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 470 (1921). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886) (The principles of the Fourth amendment “apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees to the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914)(“The Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual
misconduct of state officers. Its limitations reach the Federal Government and its agencies.”).
171. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (White, J., concurring in part).
172. Id. at 657 (majority opinion) (“Even though some circumstances—for example, if the
results of the private search are in plain view when materials are turned over to the Government—
may justify the Government’s re-examination of the materials, surely the Government may not exceed
the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search.”).
173. Id.
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the search is within the realm of the third-party search, the evidence may
lawfully be used against the accused. 174 The notion behind this theory is
that once the third-party search occurs, the defendant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy has already been thwarted, and thus, the subsequent
search by the government does no harm.
To answer the question of whether the additional intrusion by the
government exceeded the scope of the private search, courts must start by
determining how thorough and complete the private search was. 175
Jacobsen is the leading Supreme Court case analyzing the “expansion of
the private search” theory. It held that “governmental inspections
following on the heels of private searches are not searches at all as long
as police do no more than the private parties have already done.” 176 The
issue surrounding this last prong is that not all ISPs that use hash-based
examination have resources to provide “human reviewers” to review each
hash match that comes through to ensure that it is in fact illicit material. 177
Thus, if the ISP relies solely on the hash match to forward the tip to
NCMEC and an employee at NCMEC then views the images, is that a
categorical expansion of the private search that triggers the Fourth
Amendment?
Very recently, in a case similar to Reddick, the Supreme Court of
Vermont answered the question of whether the searches performed by
NCMEC and law enforcement expanded on the initial search by the
ISP. 178 The defendant in State v. Lizotte registered an account with
AOL. 179 AOL’s hash value tool, Image Detection Filtering Process,
identified two emails that contained suspected child pornography. 180
Without viewing the content of the two emails, AOL submitted two
reports to NCMEC. 181 An NCMEC analyst reviewed the video
attachment, confirming that it was child pornography. 182 The analyst then

174. Id. at 656 (“It has, of course, been settled . . . that a wrongful search or seizure conducted
by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and that such private wrongdoing does not
deprive the government of the right to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully.”).
175. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 18.06 (5th ed. 2019).
176. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 129 (1984) (White, J. concurring).
177. United States v. Coyne, 387 F. Supp. 3d 387, 392 (D. Vt. 2018) (“A large and sophisticated
[ISP] such as Microsoft employs its own human reviewers before forwarding the tip [to NCMEC].
Small [ISPs] such as Chatstep may choose to forward tips automatically without reviewing any
images themselves.”).
178. State v. Lizotte, 197 A.3d 362, 366 (Vt. 2018).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 368.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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sent a notification to the Office of the Vermont Attorney General.183 A
detective from the Attorney General’s Internet Crimes Division opened
and viewed both email attachments and then applied for a warrant to
search the defendant’s residence. 184 The defendant was charged with
possession of child pornography, promoting child pornography,
aggravated sexual assault, and lewd and lascivious conduct.185 He moved
to suppress, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
emails and that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because law
enforcement opened the attachment to his email before obtaining a
warrant. 186 The question in Lizotte was whether opening that attachment
and email allowed the government to “learn something that had not
already been discovered during the private search.” 187 The court
concluded that NCMEC and the law enforcement officers did not expand
the search conducted by AOL by opening the video attachment, because
the document was already viewed by AOL through hashing technology. 188
The hash value match confirmed the contents of the file. NCMEC and law
enforcement officers already knew what the attachment contained and
could not learn more than was already known by AOL. 189 The generally
accepted rule is that government may utilize information that is
voluntarily disclosed to a governmental entity, despite a defendant’s
expectation of privacy in that information. 190
When there is a human examiner reviewing the images before
sending the tip to NCMEC, the Supreme Court’s decisions in United
States v. Jacobsen and Walter v. United States govern. In Walter,
employees of a private company opened a carton mistakenly delivered to
their address. 191 Inside the box were sealed films “depicting homosexual
activities.” 192 The employees viewed the outside of the packages before
notifying the FBI of suspected obscenity. 193 The FBI agents used a
projector to confirm that the films were, in fact, obscenity. 194 In Jacobsen,
a FedEx employee viewed the contents of a package before notifying the

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
State v. Lizotte, 197 A.3d 362, 369 (Vt. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 374.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651–52 (1980).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
Id.
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DEA of suspected drugs. 195 The DEA arrived and conducted a field test
to confirm that the contents were, in fact, cocaine. 196 While Walter held
that the FBI significantly expanded on the view of the private party by
running the contents through a projector to determine what the substance
inside the package was, Jacobsen held to the contrary. In Jacobsen,
although the field test conducted by the DEA exceeded the scope of the
mere viewing by the private party, “[a] chemical test that merely discloses
whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any
legitimate interest in privacy.” 197 Jacobsen removed the requirement of
actual, complete identity of the substance by the private party.
When there is not a human examiner reviewing the images before
sending the tip to NCMEC, it is more comparable to the Tenth Circuit
Decision in United States v. Ackerman. 198 In Ackerman, AOL forwarded
a tip to NCMEC based solely on a hash value match. 199 An NCMEC
analysis then viewed the images before alerting law enforcement
officers. 200 The court determined that the private search doctrine did not
apply because NCMEC was the first to open and review the images. 201
Resolving this issue takes us back to the question of whether a hash value
match is an adequate basis for probable cause. If the hash value match is
comparable to, as it is frequently dubbed, a fingerprint, is the subsequent
search by NCMEC really an expansion of the private search when the
private party did not view the images? If so, this also begs the question of
whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when a
governmental agent opens the files without authorization. An
unconstitutional search undertaken in good faith and based on a
reasonable mistaken belief gives rise to a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. 202
The Court in Reddick did not analyze whether Detective Ilse’s
subsequent search was an expansion of the initial private search or
whether it was reasonable. Nevertheless, it is recommended that the
government’s search is deemed reasonable if the court used the test from
Jacobsen to balance the nature and quality of the search on the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
Id. at 111–12.
Id. at 123.
United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id. at 1305–06.
See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 547 U.S. 54 (2014).
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interest alleged to justify the intrusion. 203 Jacobsen recognizes that the
exceptions to the general rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable
are based on a “balancing [of] the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.” 204 The government undoubtedly has an
exponential interest in combating the online distribution of child sexual
abuse and pornography.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts must exercise caution when admitting evidence into the
record obtained through hash value algorithms. It is not, however, per se
unconstitutional for private internet service providers to use hash-based
examination. The precise capabilities of the hash value allow ISPs to
identify identical files without examining each individual file and their
content.
When used in the proper manner, its wide-reaching effect saves law
enforcement officers time and money while simultaneously tapering the
distribution of child pornography over our readily accessible internet and
cloud sharing software. The beneficial outcomes hash-based examination
can provide to society fortifies the need for a universal standard employed
throughout our court system to avoid pervasive misapplication of the
Fourth Amendment.
The New York Times recently published an article noting that
images and videos of child pornography being shared over the internet is
at a record 45 million, “which is increasingly cloaked by technology.” 205
This is where ISPs can step in with surveillance of their platforms.
However, ISPs must proceed with caution to avoid collaborating too
closely with law enforcement officials such that they are considered
governmental agents. In fact, many powerful tech companies have already
begun to utilize hashing technology, including AOL, Microsoft,
Facebook, Google and others. 206 With the increased surveillance by ISPs,
the Supreme Court must keep up by carefully crafting a universal analysis
for cases involving alleged Fourth Amendment violations related to the

203. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984) (quoting United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
204. Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537
(1967)).
205. Michael H. Keller & Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Internet Is Overrun with Images of Child
TIMES,
Sexual
Abuse.
What
Went
Wrong?,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/2HZSYNAX]. Last year alone, there were 18.4 billion reports of child sexual abuse imagery.
206. Id.
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use of hash values and child pornography. It is essential for our case law
to evolve with society: ensuring protection of constitutional rights and
preventing misinterpretation by the courts. Paying close attention to the
circumstances surrounding the search, courts must determine the answer
to the following questions: (1) Was the individual that conducted the
initial search in fact acting as a private individual and not a state actor?
(2) Was the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy thwarted by the
third-party doctrine? (3) Was there probable cause for the warrantless
search? (4) Was the state actor acting within the scope of the private party
search? If the answer to any of the preceding questions is no, the defendant
should be entitled to suppress the evidence gained during the
unconstitutional search. When courts choose to implement this standard
analysis, United States citizens receive proper protection both from
unreasonable search and seizure by the government, as well as protection
from the crime of child exploitation.
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